Course number		U-I	U-LAS06 10019 LE43								
Course title (and course) title in English)	ntrodu Introdu	etion to) Game Th) Game Th	eory-F	32 32	Instructor's name, job title, and department of affiliation		Gı Pr	Graduate School of Economics Program-Specific Senior Lecturer,LI CHEN		
Group Hu	manitie	es and §	Social Scie	nces	Field(Classification)			urisprudence, Politics and Economics(Foundations)			
Language of instruction	uage of action English				Old group Group A			Number of credits 2			
Number of weekly time blocks	1		Class style (1		ecture Face-to-face cou		urse)	Year/semesters		2025 • First semester	
Days and periods	Days and Mon.3/Mo		.4 Targ		get year Mainly 1st		t year students	Eliç	jible students	For al	1 majors
[Overview and purpose of the course]											
Game theory is the study of strategic interactions among rational decision-makers, where the outcome for each participant depends not only on their own actions but also on the actions of others. It provides a framework for analyzing situations in which individuals or groups must make decisions that affect one another. A complete information game is a type of game in which all players have full knowledge of the rules, strategies, and payoffs of other participants, allowing them to make fully informed decisions.											
This course will cover standard undergraduate-level material on complete information games, including the fundamental concepts, the formalization of game models, and key solution concepts such as Nash equilibrium. Through this course, students will gain a foundational understanding of strategic behavior in economic, political, and social contexts.											
[Course objectives]											
 Develop an understanding of the models and solution concepts of complete information games. Practice and acquire essential skills to analyze and solve application problems in complete information games. 											
[Course schedule and contents)]											
 What is game theory. Introduction to normal-form games. Dominance and strictly dominant strategy equilibrium. Common knowledge of rationality and iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies. Nash equilibrium: Theory. Nash equilibrium: Applications. Mixed strategy. Introduction to extensive form games. Backward induction. Subgame perfect equilibrium: Theory. Subgame perfect equilibrium: Applications. Subgame perfect equilibrium: Applications. Subgame perfect equilibrium: Applications. Bargaining game. 											
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13. Repeated game.

14. Review lecture.

(Final examination.) 15. Feedback.

15. reeuback

[Course requirements]

Certain topics will assume a foundational understanding of derivatives and integrals.

[Evaluation methods and policy]

Homework (25%) Class participation (5%) Final examination (70%)

[Textbooks]

Instructed during class

[References, etc.]

(**References, etc.**) Introduced during class

[Study outside of class (preparation and review)]

Students will be assigned three problem sets as the homework.

[Other information (office hours, etc.)]

Office hour by e-mail appointment.